ABSTRACT.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to argue that the social organization of society can have an important effect on the economic organization of that society. When we say that the social organization of society affects the economic organiza tion of that society, we mean generally that there are not markets to mediate the determination of all things people legitimately care about from an economic point of view. This "incompleteness" of markets will typically lead to an indeterminacy in the social organization, that is, in who associates with whom, who marries whom, and so on. After informally discussing these points in detail, we illustrate them in section 3 with several formal models.
Social Arrangements: A Lancastrian Approach1
We begin with what can be called a "Lancastrian" point of view. People care ultimately about a few very basic things: they want to eat and procreate, they want to be safe and secure in their physical and social environments, they want to be protected from the elements and they want these things for their children. In our economic models, we typically consider a more detailed description of preferences, describing them with utility functions whose argu ments are particular items of clothing, food, jewelry, vacation trips, and so on. From a Lancastrian point of view, these arguments of the utility functions as we typically model them are essentially inputs into a production process that transforms these items into the basic goods mentioned above. Groceries and restaurant meals are all converted into satisfaction from hunger, clothing into protection from the elements, etc.
Why
does it make a difference whether we take as the primitive of our models the more basic Lancastrian utility function or the more common utility function that takes as arguments more detailed descriptions of the things we actually purchase? There is certainly an advantage in using the latter, in that the additional detail allows us to address particular issues like the burden of taxation or distortions caused by market intervention. Further, if the process that converts the standard consumption goods into Lancastrian basic goods or needs is fixed, the more detailed utility function is simply the concatenation of this conversion function with the Lancastrian utility function.
But a central point of this paper is that the mapping from standard goods into satisfaction of basic needs is not a primitive of the environment, exoge nous and fixed, but is to a large extent a social construction.
Some part of the 1. The material in this section is largely derived from a talk given at the Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics in Alghero, Sardinia July, 1999. mapping is fixed: the thermal and water resistant properties of a coat deter mine completely the degree to which it satisfies the need for protection from the elements. But expenditure on clothing isn't driven solely by the extent to which is satisfies the desire for protection from the elements. In the US, single men that earn over $40,000 per year spend twice as much on clothing as men with average earnings. It's doubtful that the richer men are that much warmer or drier than the average, despite this additional expenditure.
What seems clear is that the purpose of the bulk of the expenditure on clothing is to influence others' opinions of us. Whether an individual is trying to impress someone of the opposite sex or to reassure the members of the community that he or she properly "belongs", the basic need that is being satisfied by most clothing purchases is not protection from the elements. The same can be said for a great deal of consumption: people don't buy Rolex watches to tell time nor do they buy Ferrari's to get to the grocery store. And there would be far less money spent on vacations if the rewere a law against telling people where you went when you got back home.
The Importance of Social Arrangements
When we say that the mapping from consumption goods to the satisfaction of basic needs is to a large extent a social construction, we don't mean that the point of some particular consumption is to satisfy basic needs that are social in nature, such as the desire for mates or friends. We take these needs to be substantively no different from the need for food and protection from elements. What we mean by the mapping being a social construction is that the relationship between the inputs -the clothes you buy -and the basic needs they are meant to satisfy -influencing potential mates and friends -is not fixed and exogenously given in the way that the protection from the elements one obtains from clothes is. There is a fundamental difference between the way clothes satisfy the basic need for protection from the elements and the way clothes satisfy basic social needs. The shoes you buy will keep your feet equally warm and dry whether the people around you know the designer's name or not, but the degree to which you impress these people is not independent of their awareness of the designer.
One could argue that the relationship between the shoes you buy and the degree to which they satisfy basic social needs is fixed and immutable; there could be a universal standard of taste that is constant across people and time. We don't think that such a claim is viable, however. This neglect is to a large extent an outgrowth of the current methodological foundations of economics. Economics has been remarkably successful compared to other social sciences, and much of the success results from the parsimonious, general models that are the basis of modern economics. Most economists have a great deal of sympathy with the idea that social arrange ments may be relevant, but worry that incorporating them into our models is too "soft". The concern is that if we incorporate social arrangements by putting things like status into the utility function, we can explain anything. It's certainly true that one can imagine thousands of meaningless regressions being run; never theless, it is possible to incorporate social arrangements into economic models without losing the discipline that standard economic modelling provides. The first hurdle in integrating agents' concern for others' opinions into economic models is determining the form that that concern might take. Consider the problem of dressing for a dinner party. Is the aim to dress simi larly to others or to be the most elegantly dressed? If it is to be the best dressed does it matter how much better dressed I am than others, or is it only the ordinal rank that matters?
If the magnitude matters, is it the difference between me and the next best dressed, the worst dressed or the average? There are probably plausible arguments for any set of answers to these ques tions. In the absence of any compelling modelling assumptions about what form a concern for others' opinion takes, there is little that can be said; diffe rent assumptions lead to different conclusions. This is the lack of discipline that economists fear necessarily accompanies an extension of economic models to include social arrangements.
There is a modelling strategy that ameliorates the difficulties that stem from our ignorance of the fine detail of an individual's concern about how his or her This suggests a modelling strategy that eliminates the need to put nonstan dard variables into the utility function, or to put it another way, eliminates the freedom to do so. In this modelling approach, one begins with a standard utility function over goods and services, but includes the social arrangements in the model. The extent to which the social arrangements affect peoples' deci sions, and the way that they do so, is determined within the model by the interrelationship between the social arrangements and economic consequences. More importantly for our purpose in this paper, the actual rate of growth of the economy at a particular time depends on the distribution of wealth in an interesting way. When a couple considers the consequences of leaving a slightly smaller bequest to their child, they are comparing the increase in their own utility from doing so with the decrease in their son's utility that results.
But part of the decrease in the son's utility is a consequence of his being lower in the ranking among men of his generation. But how much lower he will be depends on the particular distribution of wealth in that generation. A very concentrated distribution of wealth might result in a very substantial drop in the son's rank, while a very dispersed distribution would result in a comparatively much smaller drop in rank. Thus, the oversaving that results from the competition among families concerned about their sons' rank in the wealth distribution is greater when the wealth distribution is more concen trated than when it is dispersed, with the result that the part of savings that is due to rank concerns will be greater when wealth is more evenly distributed. This provides an avenue by which the wealth distribution affects investment that is generally overlooked. We add to this quite standard model an attribute that is heritable, that is, an attribute that children can acquire, if and only if, at least one parent possesses the attribute. Children with two parents possessing the attribute acquire it for sure, children with neither parent possessing it never acquire it, and children with one parent possessing it acquire it with some probability. The attribute is independent of income and does not enter any agent's utility; hence, it is irre levant from an economic point of view. We show, however, that if agents are sufficiently risk averse, there are stable social arrangements in which the attri bute matters. The particular stable social arrangement we identify is one in which high income agents with the attribute match with each other, and poor agents without the attribute match. But high income agents without the attri bute match with low income agents with the attribute. This last matching provides each agent in the pair with a benefit: the low income, high attribute agent gets higher current consumption than if he or she matched with a similar type, while the high income, low attribute type gets the chance to pass on to his children the high attribute of the low income, high attribute mate. If he or she matched with another high income, low attribute agent, children would be certain to not have the attribute. The benefit of (possibly) passing on the attribute to the children is that -under these social arrangements -high attribute agents consume more than low attribute agents. Hence, the attribute is providing partial insurance against the randomness in income that is assumed to be otherwise uninsurable.
We are interested both in the case in which the interpretation of the trans mission of the attribute from parents to children is genetic and that in which it is cultural. In the case that the attribute is transmitted genetically, it is natural to assume that when only one parent possesses the attribute, a child will have the attribute with probability 1/2. On the other hand, when it is culturally transmitted (think of teaching a child to play the piano), the probability may be much higher than 1/2. It may also be lower if there are "economies of scale" in the transmission. By "economies of scale" we mean that the proba bility that a child acquires the attribute more than doubles when we move from a single parent possessing the attribute to both parents possessing it (think here of acquiring good conversational skills). If the social arrangements that use the attribute in matching are stable, we
show that if the probability of passing the attribute on to children is below 1/2, but not too much lower, the social arrangement that utilizes the attribute will be stable but that the attribute asymptotically vanishes from the society. When the attribute is passed on with probability greater than 1/2, we show that the social arrangement that utilizes the attribute cannot be stable, that is, such an attribute cannot affect matching in a stable social arrangement.
Model
There is an infinite number of generations each consisting of a continuum of men and a continuum of women. There is a single consumption good which is not storable. Each individual in each generation is endowed with some of this good. In each generation, men and women match and consume their combined wealth (that is, the good is a public good within couples). Our interest is in the matching of men and women. We assume that matching is voluntary, that is, no unmatched pair can increase their utilities by matching (taking into account, of course, the consequences to their descendants). We call a matching that satisfies this stable', given a stable matching, we call the match between any man and woman of the population stable. Since the non-income attribute is independent of income, there trivially is a stable matching of men and women that ignores this attribute. For example, a matching that has each man of type ( , ) matching with a woman of the same type is stable. An (H,h) man can do no better than match with an (H,h) woman, since this gives each consumption this period of 2H, the highest possible, and given this matching rule, the current period's match has no effect on their descendants' consump tion since income is independent across generations. 
Similarly

A Mixed Attribute Status Ranking
We consider a matching that is not positively assortative on income and show that for some initial data of the problem, it is stable. The ranking is one in which individuals of types (H,h) and (L,l) match only with individuals of their own type. Individuals of type (H,l) match with (L,h). We next deter mine when this might be a stable matching. 
Dynamic Social Arrangements
As mentioned above, norms in a society change over time. A common lament is that "people just donyt care about the things that used to be important". The analysis above shows that while there is always a ranking based on income alone, there may be other rankings that depend on payoff irrelevant characteris tics that are stable for some values of the parameters u and ?. One could simply assert that the change in values is captured by a switch from one equilibrium ranking system to another. There are two objections to this approach.
The first objection is that we would like the change in norms in a society to be endogenous, that is, we would like the change to arise from the underlying characteristics of the society. If we simply assume that a society switches from one equilibrium to another, that provides no understanding of why the change took place. The second objection is more serious. For each of the two ranking systems to be stable, there was an incentive constraint that no unmatched pair of
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individuals would prefer to match together rather than follow the suggested matching under the proposed ranking regime. The verification of the incen tive constraints was based on the assumption that the ranking system was permanent. If agents understand that the ranking system may change in the future, this should be incorporated into the incentive constraints.
More concretely, in the mixed ranking system we analyzed above, indivi duals of type (H,l) prefer to match with a type (L,h). The type (H,l) is trading off the present period utility cost of not matching with a type (H,l) and getting higher consumption with the benefit of matching with a (L,h) that results in positive probability of having offspring with the desirable attribute, h, which assures those offspring higher consumption.
The higher expected consumption of offspring that compensates for the immediate lower consump tion is less valuable if there is a chance that future generations won't "honor" the claim to higher consumption expected for individuals with attribute h. The approach in MP is to construct an equilibrium in which the ranking is stochastic, with the change in the ranking system arising from changes in the environment. The basic idea is that, as we showed above, the possibility that a mixed ranking system is stable depends on the relationship between u and ?.
The discount factor ? is fixed, but we introduce income growth into the basic model. A high income individual who matches with a low income individual has lower utility from consumption than if he had matched with another high income individual. The utility difference, however, generally depends on the two income levels. If there is rising income, the "risk premium" an individual will pay to ameliorate the riskiness in future generations' consumption may decrease. If this risk premium does decrease, it may be that the mixed ranking status equilibrium may no longer be stable. We next analyze how this may happen in equilibrium.
We extend our basic model to include stochastic income growth. We main tain the two-income distribution that we have analyzed above, but allow the possibility that there is a one-time income increase that occurs at a random time. (We consider the case of perpetually increasing incomes below.) As above, initially there are two income levels, {H,L}. There is a pair of higher potential incomes, {ctH,aL}, a > 1; in each period there is probability p that the income increases from [H,L] to {aH,aL}.
Once incomes increase, they stay at that level permanently.
This particular income growth process preserves the relative incomes; only the level changes. Thus, if the utility function u exhibits constant relative risk aversion, the incentive constraint that determines whether the mixed ranking system is stable is satisfied at the initial income level if, and only if, it is satis fied at the higher level. That is, the introduction of stochastic income growth doesn't change the possibility of equilibria with rankings other than the income alone ranking.
Suppose, however, that the utility function u exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion. In this case the risk premium associated with the random consumption of future generations is smaller after the income increase than before, and the incentive constraint requiring a type (H,l) to prefer matching with a type (L,h) to matching with another (H,l) may not be satisfied after the income increase. If this is the case, only the ranking that depends only on income is stable after the income increase.
